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IS THERE A RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN BANK RECORDS?
DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE SAME QUESTION:
CALIFORNIA vs. FEDERAL LAW
The California Supreme Court has recently taken positions independ-
ent from those of the United States Supreme Court on several issues of
constitutional protection of individual rights.' In particular, the Cali-
fornia court in construing the state constitution has interpreted article I,
section 12 and article I, section 133 -which has language essentially the
same as that of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion--as guaranteeing rights which the Supreme Court does not find
guaranteed by the fourth amendment.5 Although it is often stated that
1. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976) (making extrajudicial confession inadmissible at trial for impeachment pur-
poses). But cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) (requiring a warrant for the arrest of
a suspect in his home). But cf. United States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976). See
People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). This deci-
sion was in response to a United States Supreme Court request for clarification, 409
U.S. 33 (1972), as to the state supreme court's bases for holding unconstitutional a
warrantless, though non-trespassory, search of an individual's trash. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486
P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971). On remand the California Supreme Court certi-
fied that it based its decision on both the California and United States Constitutions.
8 Cal. 3d at 624, 504 P.2d at 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 521. For an extensive list of
issues on which the California Supreme Court has relied on the state constitution, see
Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 273, 277-80 nn.16-18 (1973).
2. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. By voter initiative of November 5, 1974 the word "people"
replaced the former "men," and the word "privacy" was added. Referring to the
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's bank records as a constitutionally protected
inalienable right, the California Supreme Court stated:
Although the [1974] amendment [of article I, section 1] is new and its scope as
yet is neither carefully defined nor analyzed by the courts, we may safely assume
that the right of privacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to
the details of one's personal life.
Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 542 P.2d 977, 979, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553, 555 (1975) (unanimous decision).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated ... " CAL. CONsr. art.
I, § 13.
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
5. California's rationale for its independent stance has been fully laid out in the
landmark case of People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531, P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr.
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the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the individual's right
of privacy against unreasonable intrusion by government officials,6 Cali-
fornia and the United States Supreme Court do not agree on the
constitutional protection to be accorded an individual's privacy in bank
records.
315 (1975). The California court cited Supreme Court cases upholding state constitu-
tions as independent of the United States Constitution, Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road
Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965), and upholding a state's right to impose standards for
search and seizure which are higher than the minimum standards established by the
Federal Constitution. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Brisendine was a
search and seizure case involving lawful custodial transportation, as were the Supreme
Court cases of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260 (1973), which had recently been decided.
In both Robinson and Gustafson, the defendants were arrested for traffic violations and
were searched before being transported to the police station; both searches revealed
narcotics which the defendants sought to suppress. The Supreme Court held that a full
body search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement
embodied in the fourth amendment and is a reasonable search even when the officer
making the search is not looking for weapons and is not concerned for his own safety.
414 U.S. at 236. Such a search is justified because an arrestee has no significant fourth
amendment interest in personal privacy. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring in
Robinson).
In Brisendine, the defendant and his companions were discovered camping in a
restricted area, a citable offense, and were escorted through rough terrain back to the
officers' car, where they had left their citation book. Prior to this custodial transporta-
tion out of the area, the officers conducted a weapons search of the knapsacks of the
campers; in a compartment of the defendant's pack the officers found marijuana in a
frosted plastic bottle with a cap on it, and restricted pills wrapped in tin foil and enclosed
in envelopes. The California Supreme Court noted that "traditionally" any warrantless
search incident to arrest or custodial transportation is authorized only (1) to uncover
evidence of crime where there is probable cause to suspect such evidence will be found;
or (2) to find weapons which could be used to injure the arresting officer or to escape.
13 Cal. 3d at 539, 531 P.2d at 1105-06, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22, citing Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United
States v. Rabinoiitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
The California court held that under the circumstances the officers had the right to pat
down the defendant's pack for weapons, 13 Cal. 3d at 541, 531 P.2d at 1107, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 323, and, since the pack was too rigid for a pat-down to disclose whether there
were weapons, they had the right to look for weapons in the interior of the pack. Id. at
543, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 324. But since there could have been no
weapons in the opaque bottle and the envelopes, the officers went beyond the scope of
their authority in finding and seizing the narcotics. Id. at 544, 531 P.2d at 1109, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 325. The California high court refused to find Robinson and Gustafson
dispositive, holding that in those cases the United States Supreme Court had once again
merely set a minimum standard to satisfy the fourth amendment's requirements, whereas
article I, section 13 of the California Constitution requires a more exacting standard. Id.
at 545, 531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326. See 64 Ca.i. L. REv. 442 (1976); 16
SANTA CrLARA LAw. 426 (1976).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
The 1975-76 Supreme Court term produced a series of cases 7 which
narrow the scope of the fourth amendment, by limiting the areas in
which privacy is protected or by limiting the availability of the exclu-
sionary rule of evidence which makes evidence inadmissible at trial
when it was obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment
rights.8  One of these cases was United States v. Miller,9 in which the
The right of privacy is also said to be included in the right of personal security
guaranteed by the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
484-85 (1965). The first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments create zones
of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding invalid a
state penal statute which forbade dissemination of contraceptive information). The civil
right of privacy, the right to be left alone, was held in Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 291, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931), to be guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution before it was amended to expressly include the right of privacy. See note 2
supra. Privacy has also been said to be a natural right. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). See Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral
Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. Rnv. 833 (1974) (discussion of the constitutional bases of
Griswold).
Privacy limitations of the type described in this Comment are apparently restricted to
criminal and quasi-criminal trials, where the litigant is exposed to liability imposed
pursuant to a statute that is penal in nature. The Supreme Court, while narrowing the
right of privacy of the criminally accused, has expanded the personal privacy right
recognized in Griswold. The Court has broadened the privacy right of a woman to seek
abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to have an abortion without her husband's
consent, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) and in the case of a
minor, to have an abortion without parental consent. Id.
7. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) (fourth amendment permits
police inventory of lawfully impounded locked car in owner's absence); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (probable cause or reasonable
suspicion not required for selective stop and questioning at permanent border check-
points); Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (limitation of federal habeas
corpus right); United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976) (use in federal civil tax
proceeding of evidence seized illegally but in good faith by state criminal law enforce-
ment officer not forbidden by fourth amendment exclusionary rule); Andreson v. Mary-
land, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (search warrant for documents relating to-specified alleged
crime not made fatally general by addition of general phrase referring only to particu-
larized description); United States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976) (doorway of home
is public place allowing warranfless arrest); United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619
(1976) (depositor has no fourth amendment right in his bank records); Fisher v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976) (taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege not violated by
subpoena of records in hands of taxpayer's attorney); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest in public place with probable cause, despite fact of-
ficers had time to obtain warrant but failed to do so, not violation of fourth amendment;
defendant's consent to search his car, given while in custody on public street, was vol-
untary).
8. The history of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in the United States began
with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the Supreme Court said that the
use of incriminating evidence obtained by compelled production was unconstitutional
under the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 638. See note 70 infra. Almost thirty
years later, the Court declared in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that if
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment rights of an accused can be used
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Supreme Court held that a depositor has no fourth amendment right in
his bank records. 10 The facts and reasoning of Miller arise from the
Bank Secrecy Act of 197011 and the Supreme Court case which upheld
the Act, California Bankers Association v. Shultz. 2
In contrast, the California Supreme Court held in Burrows v. Superi-
or Court13 that a bank depositor does have a constitutionally protected
right of privacy in his bank records.14 The Burrows doctrine has
subsequently been developed judicially.15
against him, then the protection of the amendment is of no value. Id. at 393. Since it is
the duty of federal courts and federal officials to enforce the fourth amendment, id. at
391-92, such evidence must be inadmissible because its use would involve "a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused." Id. at 398.
The exclusionary rule originally applied only to federal courts. The Court specifically
declined to extend the rule to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
reasoning that it should not "brush aside" the majority of state practices which rejected
the rule, id. at 31-32, and that the fourth amendment could be enforced by means other
than the exclusion of evidence. Id. at 30.
This position was weakened by the decision in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960), in which the Court declared unconstitutional the practice of federal officials of
using evidence obtained by the illegal actions of state officers (the so-called "silver
platter" doctrine). A year later the Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule to the states. In overruling Wolf, the Court particularly
mentioned the case which had established the exclusionary rule for California, 367 U.S.
at 651, citing People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). In Cahan, the
California Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was a necessary remedy,
since other means had been unsuccessful in securing compliance with constitutional
requirements. 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 911. For the Supreme Court's summary
of the history of the rule, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 646-55. See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mn. L. REv. 349 (1974).
9. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
10. Id. at 1626.
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83,
1101-05, 1121-22 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1116).
12. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
13. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). See generally Note, 64
CALrF. L. REv. 470 (1976).
14. 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
15. Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1975) (standards for civil discovery of bank records); Carlson v. Superior Court, 58
Cal. App. 3d 13, 129 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976) (conflict between Miller and Burrows noted;
state appellate court is bound by Burrows); People v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d
759, 127 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1976) (exception to privacy right where customer defrauds
bank); People v. Johnson, 53 Cal. App. 3d 394, 125 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1975) (exception to
privacy right where customer defrauds bank); People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487,
124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975) (Burrows privacy right applies to telephone subscriber's
records); People v. Mahoney, 47 Cal. App. 3d 699, 122 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1975) (Burrows
privacy right applies to telephone subscriber's records; exception for customer's fraud
applies as well).
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In addition to this decisional law recognizing a right of privacy in
bank records, California recently enacted the Right to Financial Privacy
Act,16 which codifies the doctrines of Burrows and its progeny, and
establishes procedures for obtaining financial records pursuant to legal
process or under other judicial supervision. The new law balances the
governmental interest in effective law enforcement and the individual
interest in privacy, while relieving financial institutions from many of
the burdens of maintaining this balance. Similar legislation1 7 has been
introduced in Congress in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the Bank
Secrecy Act and California Bankers.
I. THm SUPREmE COURT'S LIITATION
ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that a bank
customer has no protected fourth amendment interest in his bank
records and therefore cannot challenge the validity of subpoenas of such
records.' 8 The case was an outgrowth of California Bankers Associa-
tion v. Shultz,"9 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,20 and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Act. 1
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was passed after extensive hearings
concerning the concealment of criminal acts through the use of secret
bank accounts. 2 The Congressional purpose of the Act was
to require the maintenance of appropriate types of records and the
making of appropriate reports by such businesses in the United States
16. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, f1976]
Cal. Stat. 5738 (adding sections 7460-93 to the Government Code).
17. S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.
3814 and S. 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 1622.
19. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83,
1101-05, 1121-22 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1116).
21. 31 C.F.R. § 103 et seq. (1976).
22. 416 U.S. at 25, 26 & n.1, 28-29. See generally S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); H.R. RPP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on Foreign
Bank Secrecy and Bank Records (H.R. 15073) Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-70); Hearings on Foreign Bank Secrecy
(S. 3678 and H.R. 15073) Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Congress found that
records kept by financial institutions "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations and proceedings." 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a)(1), 1951(a)
(1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1970).
[Vol. 10
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where such records or reports have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.
28
Title I authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (the Secretary) to
prescribe regulations to enforce provisions of the Act 24 which require
insured banks to make and maintain records of the identities of bank
customers and those authorized to make withdrawals,2 5 and to record
each instrument drawn on such a bank and received by it.26 Uninsured
banking institutions2 and institutions insured under the National Hous--
ing Act28 are subject to the same regulations as insured banks. In
addition, uninsured banking institutions may be required to report
ownership, control, management, and any changes therein29 and to
maintain procedures to assure compliance with the Act.30 The regula-
tions, but not the Act, permit access to the required records only
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) (uninsured banks, institutions and persons carrying out
certain banking functions). Similar language is found in 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a) (1970)
(insured banks) and in 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970) (financial institutions as defined in id.
§ 1052).
Enforcement of the Act is achieved by injunctions as well as by civil and criminal
penalties for violations of the provisions of the Act or the regulations promulgated
thereunder. See 12 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1057 (1970) (injunctions). 12
U.S.C. § 1953 (a) (2) (1970) (separate civil or criminal violation of recordkeeping
requirements for each day and each separate place where violation occurs or continues);
id. § 1955 (civil penalty up to $1000 per violator). 31 U.S.C. § 1056 (1970) (civil
penalty up to $1000 per violator of reporting requirements); id. § 1103 (civil penalty up
to amount of reportable transaction for failure to file or for misstatement in foreign
report). 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (1970) (misdemeanor, fine up to $1000); id. § 1957 (felony
with imprisonment up to five years, fine up to $10,000 for violation in furtherance of
felony violation of other federal law). 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (1970) (misdemeanor, fine up
to $1000 for violation of reporting requirements); id. § 1059 (felony with imprisonment
up to five years, fine up to $500,000 for violation in furtherance of other felony violation
of federal law or as part of pattern of violations exceeding $100,000 in twelve-month
period).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1730d, 1829b(b), 1958 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1053, 1055 (1970).
25. 12"U.S.C. § 1829b(c)-(e) (1970).
26. Id. § 1892b(d). The regulations require the copying of checks over $100 which
are payable by the bank, with exceptions for certain types of checks drawn on accounts
expected to average at least 100 checks per month. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b) (3) (1976).
Copies must also be made of unsecured loans over $5000 and of communications
regarding foreign transfers over $10,000. Id. § 103.33.
The period of retention of each type of record is to be prescribed by the Secretary. 12
U.S.C. § 1829b(g) (1970). Retention periods for various types of transaction records
have been suggested in a publication of the Bank Administration Institute. See C. CoEN,
THa BAK SEcREcY Acr AND RETENTiON oF BANK REcoRDs (1974).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (1) (1970).
28. Id. § 1730d.
29. Id. § 1952.
30. Id. § 1953(a)(2).
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through legal process."1 Title II, the Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act, 2 provides for the reporting of certain domestic and
foreign transactions. It requires the domestic financial institution and
one or more of the individual parties involved"8 to report domestic
transactions 4 over $10,000."i The Secretary may make such informa-
tion available in confidence to heads of other federal departments and
agencies upon written request stating the particular information and the
purpose for which it is desired. 36
In foreign transactions, reports3 7 of imports and exports of monetary
instruments over $5000 must state the amount and type of instrument
used,38 the origin, destination and route of transportation,3" the legal
capacity of the person filing the report,40 and the identity of the princi-
pal if the person reporting is an agent.4 The penalty for failure to file
the report as required may be forfeiture of the instrument,42 subject
to remission by the Secretary.43  Similar reports are required for trans-
actions or relationships with a foreign financial agency. 44 Individuals
are required by the regulations to report foreign transactions and interests
in foreign accounts on their annual federal income tax reports."
The constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act was challenged in a
federal district court46 in California. The plaintiffs47 relied principally
on the fourth amendment, but challenged the Act on first, fifth, ninth,
31. 31 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1976). See 416 U.S. at 34.
32. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83, 1101-05, 1121-22 (1970).
33. Id. § 1082.
34. Id. § 1081.
35. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1976).
36. 31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970); 31 C.F.R. § 103.43 (1976). It is questionable whether
this provision is consistent with the "existing legal process" referred to in the text
accompanying note 31 supra. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
37. Certain classes of persons are exempted from the reporting requirement. 31
C.F.R. § 103.23(c) (1976).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (1970).
39. Id. § 1101(b)(2).
40. Id. § 1101(b)(1).
41. Id. § 1101(b)(3).
42. Id. § 1102.
43. Id. § 1104.
44. Id. § 1121.
45. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1976).
46. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See 40 BROoKLYN L. REv.
460 (1973) (discusses rationale of Bank Secrecy Act); 42 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 162
(1973) (discusses additional cases involving recordkeeping and reporting requirements).
47. The California Bankers Association, one of its member banks, several named
individual bank customers, and the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of itself
and its members as bank depositors.
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tenth, and fourteenth amendment grounds as well.4" A three-judge
district court upheld the recordkeeping provisions and the reporting
requirements for foreign transactions; however, it enjoined enforcement
of the reporting requirements for domestic transactions as repugnant to
the fourth amendment on its face since the Act could be administered so
as to compel disclosure of all the details of a bank customer's financial
affairs.4" The Government argued that since civil and criminal penal-
ties may arise only under the regulations which implement the Act, the
Act and the regulations as actually issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury must be tested together, and that when so tested, they are valid
under the fourth amendment." Although the Act was challenged and
on appeal was decided by the Supreme Court on various constitutional
grounds,51 the discussion here focuses on the issues which are pertinent
to Miller-search and seizure and privacy.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act as implemented by the regulations.52 The recordkeeping provi-
sions, considered apart from the reporting requirements, do not violate
the fourth amendment, as there is no illegal search and seizure, and
governmental access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal
48. 347 F. Supp. at 1244; see also 416 U.S. at 41.
49. 347 F. Supp. at 1251.
50. 416 U.S. at 44.
51. At the outset, Justice Rehnquist for the majority rejected the plaintiff banks'
contention that the recordkeeping requirements violated their fifth amendment right to
due process by imposing unreasonable burdens on them and by making them agents of
the government in surveillance of its citizens. The Court reasoned that the requirements
of the Act are well within Congress' plenary authority over interstate and foreign
commerce. Id. at 46-47, 50.
The plaintiff banks' contention that the recordkeeping requirements denied them due
process since the purpose of the Act was to regulate not banks but their depositors-
banks being mere bystanders in transactions between drawer and drawee-was also
rejected; the Court found that a bank is a party to any negotiable instrument and incurs
obligations to the payee, and that it is therefore not neutral in such a transaction. Id. at
47-49. See note 55 infra.
52. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the Court's opinion, but
separately emphasized that the Bank Secrecy Act was upheld only because the regula-
tions limited the scope of the Act's disclosure requirements. 416 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell,
J., concurring). See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall separately dissented. Justice Douglas objected
that the Act and implementing regulations require disclosure beyond what would satisfy
the Congressional purpose of crime prevention, 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting),
and that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements without a hearing of probable
cause are searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 90. Justice
Marshall agreed, finding that the Act and regulations enable the government to force
banks to act as governmental agents in seizing the records of customers. Id. at 94-95.
Justice Brennan thought that Congress had given the Secretary of the Treasury
impermissibly broad authority to exercise legislative functions. Id. at 93.
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processA8 The argument that a bank, compelled to keep records, is
acting as an agent of the government and thus seizes its customers'
records was rejected on the ground that the bank is a party to the
transaction and is under compulsion only to keep and to produce its own
records,"' which many banks had been keeping voluntarily in their own
interest. 5
The Supreme Court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of
the reporting provisions of the Act and regulations. As to the foreign
reporting requirements, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision. Citing the sixty-year history of individual and corporate
income tax reporting laws, the Court pointed out that reporting require-
ments do not per se violate the fourth amendment.5 Justice Rehnquist
emphasized the plenary power of Congress to regulate foreign com-
merce57 and held the foreign reporting provisions to be sufficiently
specific in their effect as to be consistent with the fourth amendment.5 8
However, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court on the constitu-
tionality of the domestic reporting provisions, holding that, as the Act is
not self-executing, its constitutionality can be determined only by testing
it together with the regulations which implement it." The regulations
require reports of domestic transactions only by the financial institutions
involved. 0 Corporations-although they, like individuals, are protect-
ed by the fourth amendment from unlawful intrusion-do not have the
same right of privacy as do individuals.6' The Court did not address
itself to the question of whether a bank must notify those of its custom-
53. 416 U.S. at 52.
54. Id. at 52-53. The Court foreshadowed its ruling in Miller:
That the bank in making the records required by the Secretary acts under the
compulsion of the regulation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it
neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amend-
ment right.
Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 52-53.
The ACLU had challenged the recordkeeping requirements on the additional ground
that they violated the first amendment right of association of its members by compelling
disclosure of their identities, but the Court dismissed this claim as premature since no
subpoena or summons had been issued. Id. at 55-56.
56. Id. at 59-60.
57. Id. at 59.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id. at 64.
60. Id. at 65. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1976).
61. 416 U.S. at 65. The Court held that the depositor plaintiffs lacked standing
to object to the reporting requirements because they did not allege having engaged in
the types of transactions that were to be reported. Id. at 68.
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ers whose transactions must be reported, noting only that no constitu-
tional right of the banks was violated by the failure of the regulations to
require such notice.62
In response to the plaintiff banks' contentions that the recordkeeping
requirements undercut a depositor's right to effective challenge of a
third-party summons, the Supreme Court held such a claim premature
since a depositor's challenge to compelled production of his own bank
records must wait until such process issues."3 Miller addresses the
question that was thus reserved in California Bankers.
64
A. United States v. Miller
Mitchell Miller was tried for conspiracy to defraud the United States
of whiskey tax revenues."5 The evidence leading to his conviction
consisted in part of copies, maintained by two banks in compliance
with the Bank Secrecy Act, of checks which were evidence of his overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. These copied checks had been
produced in response to grand jury subpoenas duces tecum and were
introduced by the Government at trial."0
62. Id. at 70. The Court also held the depositor plaintiffs' fifth amendment self-
incrimination claims to be premature for the same reasons as their fourth amendment
claims. Id. at 72, 75. See note 61 supra. Furthermore, since the depositors could
not assert these claims at the time of the appeal, neither could the bank plaintiffs
assert them vicariously for their depositors. 416 U.S. at 71-72.
63. Id. at 51-52.
64. When Miller addressed the issue of a depositor's right to challenge a third-party
summons to his bank, the Supreme Court held that the depositor has no protectable
fourth amendment interest in his records. See notes 81-92 infra and accompanying text.
65. Miller was also accused and convicted of possessing a 7500-gallon unregistered
still, carrying on the business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to
defraud the government of whiskey tax, and possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no taxes had been paid. 96 S. Ct. at 1621. The evidence supporting Miller's
conviction for these other crimes was not considered by the Supreme Court, and is
therefore not discussed in this Comment.
66. The subpoenas, ordering the two bank presidents to appear on January 24, 1973,
were presented by agents of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Unit (ATF) of the
Treasury Department. Without notifying their depositor, the bank presidents showed
Miller's records to an ATF agent, whom they also provided with photocopies. The bank
presidents were then told they need not appear in person before the grand jury. On
February 12, 1973, nineteen days after the return date on the subpoenas, the grand jury
met and indicted Miller and four others for conspiracy. The record did not show
whether the grand jury had considered the bank records, which were, however, intro-
duced at trial as evidence of overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the
government. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 756-57 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S.
CL 1619 (1976).
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Miller sought suppression of the bank records at his trial on the
ground that the subpoenas were defective, since (1) they were issued by
the United States Attorney rather than by a court; (2) no return was
made to a court; and (3) the subpoenas were returnable on a date when
the grand jury was not in session. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, and Miller was convicted.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 67 finding that a purport-
ed grand jury subpoena, issued not by a court or by the grand jury but
by the United States Attorney's office, for a date when no grand jury
was in session, was not sufficient legal process to compel such broad
disclosure of Miller's financial records to the government.08  The ap-
peals court also held that because the rights which were threatened by
improper disclosure were those of a bank depositor and not a bank
official, the defect was not cured by the fact that bank officials had not
objected to the subpoenas but had cooperated fully.
9
The appeals court relied on the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States,
70
in which the Supreme Court held that "a compulsory production of
a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him. . . is
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment"7' 1 and is therefore forbid-
den. In reversing Miller's conviction, the Fifth Circuit held that the
government may not circumvent the fourth amendment protection man-
dated in Boyd by first requiring a third party bank to copy all of its
depositors' personal checks and then, with defective process, calling
upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those copies.72
The appeals court noted that the recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements of the Bank Secrecy Act had been constitutionally upheld by
the Supreme Court in California Bankers Association v. Shultz. 73 There,
67. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1619
(1976). See 36 IA. L. Rlv. 834 (1976).
68. 500 F.2d at 757-58.
69. Id. at 758.
70. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd appellants challenged an 1874 law, under which
the government sought forfeiture of allegedly fraudulently imported goods, because the
law provided that in customs revenue cases the court on motion of the United States
Attorney could order production of the defendant's papers, and that refusal to produce
would be taken as confession of the government's allegations. The Supreme Court held
the law unconstitutional as repugnant to the fourth and fifth amendments. It found that
the privilege against self-incrimination is violated by compelled production of self-
incriminatory papers, and that such compulsion amounted to a search and seizure. Id. at
634-35.
71. Id. at 622.
72. 500 F.2d at 757.
73. Id. at 756. See notes 46-64 supra and accompanying text.
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Justice Rehnquist declared that the Act was saved from unconstitution-
ality in part because both its legislative history and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to it "make specific reference to the fact that
access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process." 74
Relying on this passage, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that, because of the defective subpoenas, the requirements of Boyd and
California Bankers made the bank records inadmissible against Miller at
trial; the court therefore ordered a new trial," and the United States
appealed.76 The Supreme Court reversed, 77 holding that there had been
no intrusion into any area in which Miller had a protected fourth amend-
ment interest.
78
Miller's contention before the Supreme Court encompassed much of
the reasoning of the court of appeals: if the government can require
banks to keep records of depositors' transactions (as California Bankers
holds it can) and then obtain them without legal process, the govern-
ment-in not complying with the legal requirements applicable if it
proceeded against the depositor directly-can circumvent the fourth
amendment. 79  The Court, however, rephrased the issue to be "whether
the compulsion embodied in the Bank Secrecy Act. . . creates a Fourth
Amendment interest where none existed before."' Miller and the court
of appeals assumed that there was a fourth amendment right of privacy
in bank records which the government sought to violate; the Supreme
Court assumed and determined there has never been such a right.
The Supreme Court's analysis of privacy in bank records relies on the
rule formulated in Hoffa v. United States," and Katz v. United States,8
2
74. 416 U.S. at 52.
75. 500 F.2d at 758.
76. United States v. Miller, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
77. 96 S. Ct. at 1621.
78. Id. at 1622.
79. Id. at 1623.
80. Id.
81. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa sought suppression of evidence that he had tried to
bribe jurors in a previous trial. This evidence had been obtained through an informant
who was a union associate of Hoffa and who spent considerable time in Hoffa's hotel
suite during the first trial discussing the bribery attempts with Hoffa and others. The
Supreme Court held that a hotel room is a constitutionally protected area where an
individual may rely on an expectation of privacy. Id. at 301. Nevertheless, the
informant's evidence did not breach the security of Hoffa's hotel room; rather, Hoffa had
voluntarily imparted otherwise private information in the misplaced confidence that the
informant would not repeat the conversations to the government. Id. at 302.
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
Katz was convicted with evidence obtained by attaching a listening device to the outside
of a glass-walled public telephone booth. Although the device did not physically
penetrate the booth and although Katz was otherwise visible, though not audible from
19771
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that, in order to claim the protection of the fourth amendment, the
individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy.83 Thus,
when an individual exposes his affairs to the public, he loses any privacy
interest.8 Even if he conveys information to a third party on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and that his
confidence will not be betrayed, there is no fourth amendment violation
when the government nevertheless receives this information. 8  On this
basis, the Court holds that a depositor, in communicating his financial
affairs to the bank, relinquishes his right of privacy in that information
and has no reasonable expectation of privacy.8 Quoting the Congres-
sional purpose as stated in the Act,87 the Court attributes to Congress
the assumption that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank
records.
88
Thus the Court found that Miller's subpoenaed records were not
private papers protected by Boyd from compelled production, but were
business records of the banks maintained pursuant to the requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act.89 Such recordkeeping requirements are con-
stitutionally permissible because the bank itself is a party to the transac-
tions of which the records were copiedf 0 Even if the checks were not
copied, they are not private papers but negotiable instruments used in
commercial transactions, and the deposit slips and financial statements
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the bank and its
employees in the ordinary course of business. 1
By this process of reasoning the Court dismissed Miller's contention
that the acquisition of his bank records by defective subpoenas was a
violation of his fourth amendment rights.9 2
outside, the Supreme Court held that such warrantless wiretaps were an unauthorized
intrusion into an area protected by the fourth amendment when the individual had a
justifiable expectation of privacy. The Court said that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351.
83. 389 U.S. at 353.
84. Id. at 351.
85. 385 U.S. at 302. Presumably this language is not intended to depreciate the
privilege of confidentiality heretofore recognized between attorney and client, physician
and patient, penitent and confessor. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569,
1577 (1976) (attorney-client privilege). This issue is specifically left unaddressed in
Miller, 96 S. Ct. at 1624 n.4.
86. 96 S. Ct. at 1623-24.
87. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 46-64 supra.
89. 96 S. Ct. at 1623.
90. 416 U.S. at 52.
91. 96 S. Ct. at 1624.
92. Id. at 1626.
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B. The Miller Holding Was Unnecessary
The Supreme Court now appears to have an unarticulated rule under
which the government has an absolute right to know the contents of an
individual's bank records. In California Bankers this rule was based on
the question of who had standing to claim a privacy right.9" Justice
Marshall in a dissent to that opinion declared that the recordkeeping re-
quired by the Bank Secrecy Act was a seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment and therefore unlawful in the absence of probable
cause and a warrant. 94 In a dissent to Miller, he asserted that the Court
has done nothing new but has merely compounded its erroneous Cal-
ifornia Bankers holding that a depositor lacks standing to object to the
search which the recordkeeping requirements of the Act constitute,
while once the records have been made he lacks standing to object to
their being given to the government.95 The Miller ruling eliminates a
step in the Court's analysis of the government's right to bank records;
the basis of the rule has shifted from lack of standing to assert a fourth
amendment right96 to absence of a fourth amendment right itself.97
The Supreme Court's implied grant to the government of an absolute
right to disclosure is redundant in Miller, as Justice Marshall asserts; it
was also redundant in California Bankers. Bank records have long
been subject to legal process.98 This rule was never challenged in
Miller; the respondent claimed, rather, that his records had been seized
by means of a defective subpoena and thus without legal process. 99
93. 416 U.S. at 51.
94. Id. at 94-95.
95. 96 S. Ct. at 1630, quoting 416 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 416 U.S. at 53, 68.
97. 96 S. Ct. at 1621.
98. Under the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, the Internal Revenue Service may
compel production of taxpayers' records from anyone possessing them. INT. RIV. CODE
OF 1954, § 7602. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of an Internal
Revenue summons to a third-party bank. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517
(1971), citing United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1074 (1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 274 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D.
Ky. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Justice v. United States, 390 U.S. 199 (1968); First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), affg 295 F. 142, 143 (S.D. Ala. 1924). Cf.
De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936
(1963) (holding that a bank but not its taxpayer-depositor could challenge an adminis-
trative subpoena).
That a bank depositor's records can be acquired by legal process is implied in Valley
Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555;
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
99. 96 S. Ct. at 1623 n.2.
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The fourth amendment does not prevent all searches and seizures; it
merely requires that searches and seizures be reasonable in order to
minimize unnecessary intrusion into an individual's privacy.100 The
reasonableness of the government's invasion of the individual's privacy
is to be determined under the supervision of a neutral and detached
magistrate.""' Therefore the government does not need a Supreme
Court holding that a bank depositor has no fourth amendment right in
his bank records in order to obtain such records for its investigations
and prosecutions; all it needs is a subpoena.
Furthermore, under the facts of this case, if the Supreme Court
wanted to validate the procedure used by the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms agents and the United States Attorney, it had no need to go so
far as to deprive bank depositors of all fourth amendment protection.
Instead, the Court could have found that the subpoenas as issued were
not defective. 102 In its brief'0 3 the Government argued that blank sub-
poenas issued by the clerk of the court and filled in by an administrative
agency-here the United States Attorney's office-are customary and
are authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 0 4  The
Government also argued that it is neither customary nor convenient for
either the court or the grand jury to waste its time preparing and re-
viewing subpoenas. Finally, the Government contended that there is
no authority requiring a grand jury to be in session when the subpoenas
are returnable, and that in fact, government counsel have a right to take
time to inspect the produced documents before making a presentation
to the grand jury. 10 5
The Supreme Court has said that it decides cases on grounds other
than constitutional ones if possible. 10 6 Therefore, in Miller, the Court
100. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960).
101. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
102. In its Supreme Court petition the Government contended that the court of ap-
peals had erred in (1) finding the bank customer had a fourth amendment interest in
the records subpoenaed, (2) holding that the subpoenas were defective, and (3) finding
that suppression was the customer's appropriate remedy if there was a violation of his
constitutional rights. The Court decided the constitutional question and therefore did
not reach the latter two contentions. 96 S. Ct. at 1622.
103. Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
104. FED. 1M CRiM. P. 17(a).
105. Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
106. Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 15 U.S. 605, 643 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 429, 444 (1968) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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should have dealt with the narrower issue of the sufficiency of the
subpoenas before deciding whether a depositor has a fourth amendment
right. The Court noted that the requirements of judicial scrutiny for a
subpoena duces tecum are no more stringent than those for an ordinary
subpoena, and are less strict than those for a search warrant. 0 7  The
Court thus implied that had it considered the question, it would have
ruled that the subpoenas used to obtain Miller's records were sufficient
legal process to comply with the demands of California Bankers.05
C. The Consequences of Miller Are Undesirable
As a result of Miller, which holds that the depositor has no privacy
right in his bank records, the government need not validate its seizure of
a depositor's records unless the bank which holds them objects. This
conclusion is nowhere explicit; it follows from the Court's holding. The
Court has stripped the bank customer of any means of protecting his
financial affairs from public scrutiny. 0 9 One consequence of Miller is
that an individual who wants to maintain the privacy of his financial
affairs must deal entirely in cash because otherwise he abandons his
fourth amendment right by divulging these affairs to third persons. This
is surely an unrealistic condition for the nation's high Court to impose in
the twentieth century.
A second consequence is that if a person does confide his affairs to a
bank, thus giving up any personal right to protect his privacy, he cannot
rely on his bank to protect his privacy interest. Even a bank which
desires to protect its customers' privacy can at most demand a valid sub-
poena or warrant from investigating authorities and notify its deposi-
tor of the investigation. But since banks are heavily regulated
107. 96 S. Ct. at 1625 & n.8, quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 208 (1946); also citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1973).
108. 416 U.S. at 52.
109. Justice Powell in writing for the majority has thus implicitly repudiated the
concern he expressed in his concurring opinion in California Bankers. He stated:
A significant extension of the regulations' reporting requirements . . . would pose
substantial and difficult constitutional questions for me. In their full reach, the
reports apparently authorized by the open-ended language of the [Bank Secrecy]
Act touch upon intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs. Financial trans-
actions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At
some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate
expectations of privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is particularly acute
where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access to this information without
invocation of the judicial process. In such instances, the important responsibility
for balancing societal and individual interests is left to unreviewed executive dis-
cretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. 416 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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by the federal government, it may well be in a bank's own inter-
est not to protest compelled production on behalf of one of its
depositors but to cooperate with the authorities. 110 Thus the bank
patron has no standing to protect his financial affairs from intrusion,"'
nor can he rely on the bank to whom he entrusts confidential informa-
tion for this protection. There is no means by which he can prevent or
limit the government's inquiry into what he does with his money, to
whom he gives it, for what purpose, and under what circumstances.
Finally, as Justice Powell suggested in California Bankers, the
potential for abuse is acute." 2  The government, or an individual
government agent acting on his own, can obtain personal information
about a depositor for any purpose as long as the bank does not protest
the demanded production as burdensome. Without judicial supervi-
sion, the intimate areas of an individual's affairs which his financial
records reveal may be subject to unlimited intrusions.
These undesirable consequences of Miller demonstrate the need for
an alternate solution to the issue of financial privacy. The Supreme
Court of California has considered and resolved this problem in a
manner which may be more rational than that of the United States
Supreme Court.
I. CALIFORNIA'S INDEPENDENT POSITION ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Justice Brennan, dissenting in United States v. Miller, noted
the emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon state con-
stitutional protections of individual liberties-protections pervading
counterpart provisions of the United States Constitution, but increas-
ingly being ignored by decisions of this Court. 81
Justice Brennan quoted extensively from Burrows v. Superior Court,'14 a
recent California Supreme Court decision, observing that it provided a
striking illustration of this trend. In Burrows, the unanimous state
110. Brief for Respondent at 14, United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
Miller's case exemplifies this process: the two bank presidents cooperated with investiga-
tors and were then relieved of the duty to appear in person before the grand jury.
111. 96 S. Ct. at 1625.
112. 416 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). That there is potential for abuse in the
subpoena system used in Miller was conceded by the Government. Brief for Petitioner at
40, United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
113. 96 S. Ct. at 1629 (footnote omitted).
114. 96 S. Ct. at 1627-29, quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243-
48, 529 P.2d 590, 593-96, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169-72 (1974).
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court relied on the California Constitution rather than conform to the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constita-
tion."15
A. Burrows v. Superior Court
Burrows, an attorney, was suspected of misappropriating a client's
funds. After a search of Burrows' office and car revealed checkstubs, a
sheriff's detective requested copies of Burrows' financial records from
his bank without presenting a subpoena for them. The bank voluntari-
ly116 supplied photocopies of Burrows' bank statements. The trial court
1-15. One may speculate whether the California court would have been unanimous in
Burrows and in Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975) if the Supreme Court had previously handed down its decision
in Miller. Burrows was shortly preceded by United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751
(5th Cir. 1974), and the Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari.
In spite of the federal (see note 5 supra) and state authority for not relying solely on
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution, California
Justices Richardson and Clark have consistently criticized the majority for its lack of
deference to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 277, 545
P.2d 1333, 1351, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); People v.
Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 117-21, 545 P.2d 272, 282-85, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370-73
(1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting); People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 940, 538 P.2d
237, 245, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117 (1975) (Richardson, I., concurring); id. at 940-42,
538 P.2d at 245-47, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 117-19 (Clark, J., dissenting).
The position of these dissenting justices has been made somewhat anomalous by the
Burrows-Miller conflict. On the one hand, they believe California should defer to
Supreme Court interpretations of the fourth amendment in interpreting article I, section
13 of the state constitution, but on the other hand they were part of the unanimous
Burrows court that held that the state constitution protects a bank depositor's right of
privacy. It will be noted that the Burrows opinion rested solely on article I, section 13,
as section 1 had not yet been amended to make privacy an inalienable right, and
section 24 had not yet been added. Justices Richardson and Clark impliedly approved
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and holding in Miller which the United States Supreme
Court later repudiated. Although the two justices could have dissented on the facts or
the law in Burrows, they did not do so. As a result, they voted their consciences, free
from the inhibiting precedents of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has subse-
quently left them unable to defer to its precedents without reversing their stand on privacy
in financial records.
116. In Miller, Justice Powell distinguishes Burrows on the ground that in Burrows the
depositor's bank records had been furnished voluntarily to the government by the bank.
96 S. Ct. at 1625 n.7. But by the Court's own terms this distinction is irrelevant; the
Court expressly did not reach the question of whether the subpoenas to Miller's banks
were defective, holding at the threshhold that the depositor had no protectable fourth
amendment rights in his bank records in any case. Id. at 1626. From the Supreme
Court's point of view both Miller and Burrows present the same issue: whether a bank
depositor has in his bank records a right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment
so as to require legal process in order for the government to obtain them. Since the
relevant language in the California and United States Constitutions is the same, and
since the issues in the two cases are identical although the constitutional conclusions
reached in the two cases are contrary, Justice Powell's distinction is illusory.
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denied his motion to suppress, finding that the search and seizure of the
photocopied bank records was reasonable.
117
The California Supreme Court's analysis of a bank depositor's right
of privacy differed in most respects from that in Miller. Most important-
ly, the California court at the threshold found it indisputable that a
bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding infor-
mation contained in such documents as checks which he transmits to the
bank in the course of his business operations.118 The court noted too
that the prosecution had conceded the reasonableness of the customer's
expectation of privacy, and that several bank representatives had testi-
fied that they deemed such information confidential. Thus, a bank
customer was held to have a reasonable expectation that information he
gives to the bank will be used only for internal banking purposes, and
that this confidentiality will be breached only pursuant to legal
process.'1 9
In finding this reasonable expectation of privacy and the consequent
requirement of legal process to intrude on that privacy, California is
now in direct conflict with the Supreme Court.120  In Miller, the Su-
preme Court found no right of privacy in bank records, and consequently
found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the subpoenas in
that case were defective.' 1
Additionally, the Burrows court-citing the Fifth Circuit Miller deci-
sion-held that the right of privacy belongs to the depositor. 2 2  The
fact that the records sought by the government are in the possession of
117. 13 Cal. 3d at 242, 529 P.2d at 592, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
118. It is noteworthy that California appears to regard a depositor's communications
to his bank as private, even when they are made in the course of his business operations.
Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169. In this respect the California court
goes even further than does Justice Brennan, who concurred in the result in the recent
case of Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1582 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring),
only because business papers, not private papers, were involved.
119. 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The right of
confidentiality is now codified by the California Right to Financial Privacy Act. See
text accompanying notes 152-78 infra.
Other jurisdictions as well hold that a bank impliedly agrees not to divulge confidential
information without the customer's consent unless compelled by court order. Valley
Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657, 542 P.2d 977, 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555
(1975), citing First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181- N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1970); Milohnich
v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. App. 1969).
120. See note 115 supra.
121. 96 S. Ct. at 1622.
122. 13 Cal. 3d at 245, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170, citing United States v.
Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 10
PRIVACY IN BANK RECORDS
the bank and not the depositor is not determinative. 12  Quoting from
Katz v. United States, 24 in which the Supreme Court found that "the
premise that property interests control the right of the government to
search and seize has been discredited,"'12 5 the California court held that
the mere fact that the bank purports to own the records-which it may
use for a limited purpose-does not diminish the depositor's expecta-
tion of privacy.126 That the bank copies documents or records informa-
tion in different form for its own purposes is likewise irrelevant. 27 The
California court distinguished a group of federal cases 28 which held, as
the Supreme Court subsequently did in Miller, that a depositor has no
proprietary interest in the records of his account maintained by a bank
and no standing to resist their compelled production. The court noted
that even those federal cases involved judicial supervision of the sei-
zures, 29 a condition which Miller does not require.
Since the protected right was the depositor's and not the bank's, the
California court deemed it irrelevant that Burrows' bank responded
voluntarily to a mere request for his records.'8 0 But the court also ex-
pressed its approval of the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Miller that pro-
duction of bank records could not be compelled by a defective subpoena
and that the defect was not removed by the bank's voluntary com-
pliance.'
3'
Thus, the California Supreme Court held that any bank records
obtained by the prosecution with neither legal process nor the consent of
the depositor are the fruit of a search and seizure illegal under article I,
section 13 of the California Constitution. Therefore, the exclusionary
rule was applicable to suppress the evidence so seized.'
8 2
Describing the scope of personal information found in bank records,
123. 13 Cal. 3d at 244, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
124. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125. Id. at 353, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
126. 13 Cal. 3d at 244, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1013 (1970) (bank records are not property of customer who has no standing
to assert fourth or fifth amendment right); Harris v. United States, 413 .2d 316, 318-19
(9th Cir. 1969) (customer's motion to quash subpoena duces tecum for bank records
denied for lack of standing; communications between bank and customer not privileged);
Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968) (customer's motion to
quash subpoena duces tecum denied for lack of standing).
129. 13 Cal. 3d at 244, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
130. Id. at 245, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
131. Id., citing United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct.
1619 (1976).
132. 13 Cal. 3d at 245, 529 P.2d at 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
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and the undesirable consequences of abusive intrusion, Justice Mosk
stated:
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms
of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account. In the course of such dealings, a
depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits
and associations. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual
current biography. While we are concerned in the present case only
with bank statements, the logical extension of the contention that the
bank's ownership of records permits free access to them by any police
officer extends far beyond such statements to checks, savings, bonds,
loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which the customer
has supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of his financial affairs
upon the reasonable assumption that -the information would remain
confidential. To permit a police officer access to these records merely
upon his request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other
traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the evidence to
be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution against a defendant,
opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of very real abuses of
police power.'3
3
The California court has thus predicted the probable implications of
the Supreme Court's stand in United States v. Miller.284 First, the
Supreme Court apparently assumes that disclosure of one's financial
affairs to a bank is entirely volitional, since it does not directly address
the question. When Justice Powell writes for the Court that "[t]he
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the government,"' 185 he
implies that a person has the option not to use banks and thus to avoid
communicating private information to them. The California Supreme
Court is more clear-sighted than this and recognizes the necessity in
contemporary society of relying on banking services. It is dismaying to
note the lack of intellectual honesty on the part of the Supreme Court
which permits it to ignore such a commonly-acknowledged aspect of
modem American life, in order to make it easier for the government to
obtain information about its citizens.
Second, the California court has pointed out the number and variety
of transactions for which a customer provides personal information to a
133. Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
134. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976). See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
135. Id. at 1624, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
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bank;" 6 there is nothing in Miller to prevent the records of all these
transactions from being searched and seized. If such information is not
protected by the fourth amendment, then, as Justice Mosk warns in
Burrows, there is no neutral judicial supervision of the search and
seizure of the records, and no means for the depositor to resist the
intrusion. In short, Justice Mosk is probably forecasting all too accu-
rately the degree to which the government's curiosity about its citizens
is to be satisfied and police power abused on the federal level.
There is a further consequence unaddressed by either court. If the
bank customer has no protectable fourth amendment right of privacy
nor any proprietary right in his records, it may be questioned whether he
has any right in them whatever. There would thus appear to be no legal
obstacle, as far as federal courts are concerned, to the bank's giving its
customers' records to anyone who asks for them, or indeed selling them
to entrepreneurs. Presumably the Supreme Court did not contemplate
these uses of bank records, but it appears that Miller and California
Bankers may allow for such abuses.
B. The Progeny of Burrows
The import of Burrows has been refined by several subsequent deci-
sions. Two appellate cases137 relied upon an exception in Bur-
rows to the bank customer's right of privacy. As noted, Burrows held
that it is the depositor who has the right of privacy, and that the bank is
merely a neutral entity with no significant interest in the customer's
privacy or the invasion thereof1 3 8 by the government. The exception,
expressed in dictum in Burrows, is that where the bank is not neutral,
but is itself a victim of the defendant's wrongdoing, the depositor's right
of privacy will not prevail. 3 9
In People v. Johnson,140 defendant wrote a check on a closed bank
account; he was charged with writing a check on insufficient funds with
136. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
137. People v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 759, 127 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1976) (bad
checks); People v. Johnson, 53 Cal. App. 3d 394, 125 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1975) (bad
check). A third case, People v. Mahoney, 47 Cal. App. 3d 699, 122 Cal. Rptr. 174
(1975), applies the exception in Burrows to the records of a telephone subscriber who
evaded payment of long distance tolls by the use of an electronic device.
138. See notes 122-27 supra and accompanying text. The court ignored any possible
interest the bank might have in protecting the depositor's privacy.
139. 13 Cal. 3d at 245, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170. The sentence
enunciating the exception was added by modification of the original opinion. Burrows v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 732a (advance sheets) (1975).
140. 53 Cal. App. 3d 394, 125 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1975).
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intent to defraud the bank and the payee. In an informal telephone
conversation, the district attorney's investigator was told by the bank
that defendant's account had been closed for a year. The defendant
sought suppression of the bank's evidence, claiming that the warrant
subsequently obtained by the investigator for the account records was
invalid because it was the fruit of an illegal search pursuant to an
informal request and was thus forbidden by Burrows."'1 In People v.
Superior Court,14 2 the defendant had written several checks with insuffi-
cient funds and the bank had not honored them. Without a warrant the
bank had given defendant's records to the prosecution as evidence.1
4 1
Even though the bank had suffered no actual monetary loss, it was
nevertheless a potential victim of defendant's attempt to defraud it and
was, therefore, not neutral. In short, the bank's neutrality does not
depend on the successful completion of a crime.
4
Thus, the California appellate courts which have dealt with the
question'45 have interpreted Burrows as holding that the customer can
141. Id. at 396, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
142. 55 Cal. App. 3d 759, 127 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1976).
143. In People v. Mahoney, 47 Cal. App. 3d 699, 122 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1975), the
telephone company was informed that defendant manufactured, sold, and was himself
using a "blue box," a device which would emit electronically produced tones to signal the
company's switching equipment to make long distance connections, thus enabling the
caller to use the company's long distance system without paying tolls. The company
investigated thoroughly and then without a warrant turned the results of its investigation
over to the district attorney. The exception in Burrows was held to apply to a telephone
subscriber's records as well as to those of a bank depositor.
144. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
145. An appellate case subsequent to Mahoney, People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d
487, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975), explored more thoroughly the right of privacy in a
telephone subscriber's records. The defendant was accused of distributing property
stolen from his employer, an aircraft manufacturer. Evidence of his guilt was obtained
by searching the telephone company's records of calls made by an informant-the
purported receiver of the stolen goods-for records of calls made by the informant to
defendant. All the informant's records had been voluntarily furnished to agents by the
telephone company.
The court held that the principle of Burrows applies to subscriber records maintained
by a telephone company. The user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his calls,
and justifiably expects that records of his calls are to be used by the phone company only
for billing purposes. This expectation corresponds to a bank depositor's reasonable
expectation that his financial records are private and are to be used for a limited purpose
by the bank. Thus, a telephone subscriber's records are obtainable only with a warrant.
Id. at 492, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. The court suggests that the illegal search may
have violated the privacy right of other patrons and of the informant himself on calls not
related to the investigation. Id. at 491-92, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
This case suggests yet another issue on which California differs from federal constitu-
tional interpretation. Rather than the defendant, it was the informant who had a right
of privacy violated by the search. Under federal decisions, the defendant would,
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claim a right of privacy in his records only when the bank is truly a
neutral entity-in effect a mere depository for the customer's funds-
with no interest in consenting to the government's search or seizure of its
records relating to the defendant. However, it appears that where the
bank is a victim of the depositor's activity, it does have an interest in
aiding the prosecution of its wrongdoer. Then the prosecution may
legitimately obtain without a warrant evidence of defendant's crime if
the victimized bank'46 offers it or is willing to provide it.
The California Supreme Court further elaborated the depositor's right
of privacy in his bank records in Valley Bank v. Superior Court.147  In
therefore, not have standing to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969). However, in California a defendant has
standing to claim application of the exclusionary rule where the privacy of another is
violated. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 161, 491 P.2d 1, 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649,
656 (1971) ("vicarious exclusionary rule"). Such a result demonstrates that California
takes seriously the exclusionary rule's goal of deterrence of governmental violations of
the constitutional rights of individuals; the government is not to be permitted to convict a
defendant by violating the rights of a third person.
146. There is no privilege of confidential communication between bank and depositor.
Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 542 P.2d 977, 978, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553, 554 (1975). Nor do the opinions in Burrows or the appellate cases here discussed
mention such a privilege. Nevertheless, the appellate court analyses of the Burrows
exception to the bank customer's right of privacy suggest an analogy with statutory
exceptions to the evidentiary privileges between attorney and client (CAL. Evm. CODE §
958 (West 1968)), spouses (CAL. Evm. CODE § 985 (West Supp. 1976)), physician and
patient (CAL. Evm. CODE § 1001 (West 1968)), and psychotherapist and patient (id. §
1020). The statutory sections represent two types of situations which are suggested by
the Burrows exception: (1) A duty created by the relationship which gave rise to the
privilege has been breached. Cf. CAL. Evm. CODE § 958 (West 1968): "There is no
privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the
lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship." Cf. id.
§§ 1001, 1020. Analogous to this is a customer's attempt to defraud his bank by writing
checks on insufficient funds or to defraud the phone company by using a "blue box" to
avoid paying for long distance calls; the customer has thus breached his duty as depositor
or subscriber and consequently has no right to insist that disclosure of his records be
protected by judicial process. (2) A crime has been committed by one party to the
privileged relationship against the other. Cf. CAL. EviD. CODE § 985 (West Supp.
1976):
There is no privilege under this article in a criminal proceeding in which one
spouse is charged with:
(a) A crime committed at any time against the person or property of the other
spouse or of a child of either.
(b) A crime committed at any time against the person or property of a third
person committed in the course of committing a crime against the person or prop-
erty of the other spouse. ...
An analogy arises where the defrauding customer has committed a crime against the
bank or phone company. In People v. Johnson, 53 Cal. App. 3d 394, 125 Cal. Rptr. 725
(1975), the crime was committed against the third-party payee as well as against the
bank.
147. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
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that case, a unanimous 148 court dealt with the issue of the circumstances
under which a civil litigant can compel discovery of a bank customer's
confidential records. The bank sued the real party in interest to collect
on a promissory note in a real estate transaction. The defense was
fraud, and the real party in interest attempted to compel the bank to
produce the records of the other parties to the transaction, in order to
prove the fraud; the bank resisted.' 40
Noting that the present statutory and discovery schemes do not ade-
quately protect a bank customer's confidentiality, the court held that
compelled discovery must be conditioned on balancing the right of
discovery by civil litigants against the customer's right of privacy.'8 0 The
court further held that before the bank produces a customer's records it
must (1) take reasonable steps to locate the customer; (2) inform the
customer of discovery proceedings; and (3) allow the customer reasona-
ble opportunity to object and to seek appropriate protective orders.'"
The California Supreme Court's procedure for protecting the privacy
right of bank depositors while accommodating those who have a right to
information contained in the depositors' records appears to be a practi-
cal resolution of conflicting interests. It should recommend itself to the
federal courts as a model of how to preserve individual rights to privacy
without denying the rights of society to have access to important records.
Ill. FINANCIAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION
California's Supreme Court and appellate court provisions for privacy
in bank records have been reinforced and amplified by legislation. The
state recently enacted the California Right to Financial Privacy Act
148. Richardson, J., wrote the opinion for the court. Mosk, I., did not participate, but
Molinari, J., was assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
149. 15 Cal. 3d at 654-55, 542 P.2d at 977-78, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54.
150. 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
151. Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
In a recent case, Carlson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 13, 129 Cal. Rptr. 650
(1976), the court noted the conflicting holdings of Miller and Burrows and observed
that, as a state intermediate appellate court, it was bound by the Burrows rule. Id. at 20,
129 Cal. Rptr. at 654. The district attorney subpoenaed the defendant's bank records
and, without the depositor's knowledge or consent, his banks delivered copies of his
records to the district attorney before the date on which the bank officials had been
ordered to appear and produce. The court held that the evidence must be suppressed
because the legal process requirements of Burrows had not been met; when the banks
turned over the records and the district attorney received them out of court, the
defendant was deprived of an opportunity to have a judicial determination of the district
attorney's right to the documents. Id. at 21, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 655. Cf. Bowser v. First
Nat'l Bank, 590 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1975) (taxpayer entitled to litigate validity of
IRS subpoena of bank records).
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(Financial Privacy Act)152 which allows access to financial records only
pursuant to legal process and provides civil and criminal penalties for
willful violation of any of the prescribed procedures. Similar legislation
has unsuccessfully been introduced in Congress periodically since pas-
sage of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.1s The provisions of the
Financial Privacy Act will be compared with the provisions of proposed
federal legislation.' 54
The California Right to Financial Privacy Act codifies the holdings of
Burrows, Johnson, and People v. Superior Court'55 and provides proce-
dures to protect the customer of a financial institution without unduly
hampering law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prevention
of crime. 56 The Act explicitly recognizes a right of confidentiality
within the bank-customer relationship.
157
The Financial Privacy Act limits access by state and local agencies
making civil or criminal investigations of a bank customer.5 8 The Act
152. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5738 (adding sections 7460-93 to the Government Code).
153. See S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
S. 3814 and S. 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Administrative summons and subpoenas are required for Internal Revenue Service ex-
amination of bank records. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 1205,
90 Stat. 1699 (to be codified as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7609).
154. S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1343]. This was the
most recent reintroduction by Sen. Alan Cranston of the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1973.
155. 55 Cal. App. 3d 759, 127 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1976).
156. The statutory declaration of policy provides:
The purpose of this [Act] is to clarify and protect the confidential relationship be-
tween financial institutions and their customers and to balance a citizen's right of
privacy with the governmental interest in obtaining information for specific purposes
and by specified procedures as set forth in this [Act].
California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, [1976] Cal.
Stat. 5738 (adding section 7461(c) to the Government Code). S. 1343, § 2(b) is
similar, but further provides that customers have the same right of protection against
unwarranted disclosure as if the records were in their possession. Cf. id. § 4(b).
157. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5738 (adding sections 7461(b), (c) to the Government Code).
158. In order to maintain consistency with prior discussion in this Comment, the term
"bank" is used in discussing the California Right to Financial Privacy Act. The statute,
however, refers to "financial institutions," which are defined therein as including state
and national banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions, as well as trust
companies and industrial loan companies. Id. (adding section 7465(a) to the Govern-
ment Code). A "person" includes any natural or artificial person, id. (adding section
7465(c) to the Government Code), and a "customer" is any person involved in a
transactional, service, or fiduciary relationship with the financial institution. Id. (adding
section 7465(d) to the Government Code). The federal bill does not refer to the
fiduciary relationship between a financial institution and its customers. S. 1343, § 3(d).
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provides that information contained in financial records' 59 can be ob-
tained only if (1) the records are described with particularity, (2) they
are consistent with the scope of the investigation, and (3) the customer
has authorized their disclosure.160 They may also be disclosed in re-
sponse to an administrative subpoena or summons,'61 a search war-
159. "Records" include any original or copy of records pertaining to bank customers.
California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, [1976] Cal.
Stat. 5738 (adding section 7465(b) to the Government Code).
160. Id. at 5739 (adding section 7470 to the Government Code). To be valid, a
customer's authorization must (1) be for a stated period (S. .1343, § 6(a) (1) limits this
period to one year), (2) specify the agency which is to receive the information and, if
applicable, the statutory purpose of the disclosure, and (3) identify the records to be
disclosed. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5740 (adding section 7473(a) to the Government Code). No
financial institution may require such an authorization as a condition of doing business.
Id. (adding section 7473(b) to the Government Code). Any governmental agency
seeking such authorization must notify the customer that his authorization, except where
required by statute, is revocable at any time. Id. (adding section 7473(c) to the
Government Code). When the records are examined, the customer must be notified
within thirty days of the specific records which were examined and of his right to be
informed, on request, of the reason for the examination. Id. (adding section 7473 (d) to
the Government Code).
161. Id. (adding section 7474 to the Government Code). Disclosure may be made
pursuant to an administrative subpoena or summons only if (1) such process is served on
the customer, (2) it identifies the issuing agency and the statutory purpose to be served,
and (3) the customer has not moved to quash within ten days of service. Id. (adding
section 7474(a) to the Government Code). Such a motion is to have priority on the
court calendar and is to be heard within ten days of being filed. Id. at 5741 (adding
section 7474(d) to the Government Code). These requirements imply that the Califor-
nia legislature has accepted the Burrows assumption that a customer has a protectable
proprietary interest in his financial records, even though they are in the possession of the
bank. See notes 122-27 supra and accompanying text; cf. S. 1343, §§ 2(b), 4(b), which
provide a customer with the same protection as if his records were in his possession.
The provisions of this section balance the requirements of effective law enforcement
against the privacy of a bank customer. An exception to the requirement of service and
the availability of a motion to quash is made where there is reason to infer that a law
has been or is about to be violated. Upon petition of the Attorney General or the
Commissioner of Corporations in such case, a court may waive or shorten the service
and ten-day period. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch.
1320, § 5, [1976] Cal. Stat. 5741 (adding section 7474(b) (1) to the Government
Code). When such a petition is granted, the petitioning agency must notify the
customer of the examination within a judicially specified period, Id. (adding section
7474(b) (3) to the Government Code). Except when such petition is granted and the
court finds that such notice would impede the investigation, a financial institution is not
precluded from notifying its customer of the receipt of an administrative summons or
subpoena. Id. (adding section 7474(c) to the Government Code). The records so
obtained may not be disclosed to a local law enforcment agency which has not
independently been authorized to receive such information. Id. (adding section
7474(b) (4) to the Government Code).
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rant, 162 or a judicial subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.168
Disclosure pursuant to such procedures is controlled by detailed
provisions of the Financial Privacy Act.164  The federal proposal differs
most from the California Right to Financial Privacy Act in providing
the customer with an absolute right to service of process or to notifica-
tion that his bank has been served; the bank may then comply only if
ordered to do so by the customer, or by a court after the customer has
had an opportunity to challenge the subpoena or summons. 165 In
contrast, the California law permits a court to waive service and prior
notice in cases of statutory violation, but still provides for subsequent
notification to the customer of an examination of his records.
166
A number of provisions relieve financial institutions of unreasonable
burdens of complying with the Financial Privacy Act. They are not
liable if they disclose records in response to customer authorization or
legal process which is facially valid,167 or if they refuse disclosure where
162. Id. (adding section 7475 to the Government Code). Disclosure pursuant to a
search warrant may be had as soon as the warrant is served on the financial institution.
Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1523 et seq. (West 1972) (search warrants). Pro-
visions for notifying the customer that the bank has received the search warrant are
similar to those pertaining to an administrative subpoena or summons. See note 161
supra.
S. 1343, § 8 requires service on the customer as well as on the bank.
163. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5742 (adding section 7476 to the Government Code). The financial
institution may disclose a customer's records pursuant to a judicial subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum only if (1) such process is served on both the bank and its customer and
(2) the customer has not notified the bank within ten days of service that he has moved
to quash the subpoena, except that the ten-day period may be shortened. Id. (adding
section 7476(a) to the Government Code), which encompasses the provisions of CAL.
CODE CMv. PRO. §§ 1985 et seq. (West Supp. 1977) (subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum). Provision is also made for acquisition of records by a grand jury pursuant to a
judicial subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, California Right to Financial Privacy Act of
Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, [1976] Cal. Stat. 5742 (adding section 7476(b) to the
Government Code), in accordance with CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 (West 1972)
(subpoenas for witnesses).
164. See notes 160-63 supra.
165. S. 1343, § 7. Law enforcement personnel have strongly objected to these
provisions on the ground that the criminally motivated bank customer will make his
records unavailable if given notice of an investigation. See Hearings on S. 2200 Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 143-45 (1974). Other sections of S. 1343 also differ
from the California law by omitting provisions for access to records without the
customer's consent or a court order. Compare S. 1343, § 11 with California Right to
Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, [1976] Cal. Stat. 5742 (adding
section 7480 to the Government Code). See notes 171-75 infra.
166. See note 161 supra.
167. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
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they believe in good faith that the authorization or legal process does not
comply with statutory requirements.1 8 On their own initiative, though
not in response to a request, financial institutions may disclose a custom-
er's records where there is suspected violation of a law.""9 They may
also make disclosures in the normal course of business where they have
no reason to expect that the information disclosed will be used in an
investigation of the customer. 70
The statute provides exceptions to the requirement of customer con-
sent or legal process. A bank may disseminate financial information
which is not identifiable with a particular customer. 17' When a law
enforcement agency certifies in writing to a bank that a crime report
involving check fraud or a similar offense has been filed, the agency
may request and receive from the bank a statement of certain informa-
tion concerning the customer's account activity.' 7 2 Law enforcement
and tax agencies may in any case request and receive the account num-
bers of a bank customer.' 73 Financial supervisory agencies may exam-
[19761 Cal. Stat. 5739 (adding section 7470(b) to the Government Code). The bank
must maintain a record of all such disclosures for five years, and any such record shall
be available for customer inspection within five days of his request. Id. (adding section
7470(c) to the Government Code). These provisions are not included in S. 1343.
168. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5740 (adding section 7471(d) to the Government Code). This
provision does not appear in S. 1343.
169. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5740 (adding section 7471(c) to the Government Code). This
provision codifies and expands the exception stated in Burrows, which permits a bank to
consent to disclosure of a customer's records without legal process when the customer is
suspected of defrauding the bank itself. See note 139 supra.
170. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5, [1976]
Cal. Stat. 5740 (adding sections 7471(a), (b) to the Government Code). The Act does
not preclude financial institutions from freely exchanging information as needed for
credit transactions, collections, and the like, in the normal course of banking business.
The exemption does not appear in S. 1343
171. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5742 (adding section 7480(a) to the Government Code).
172. Id. (adding section 7480(b) to the Government Code). Information may be
supplied no more than thirty days prior to and following the date of the alleged
fraudulent act. Upon request the bank must provide a statement of the customer's
account specifying (1) the number of items dishonored, (2) the number of paid items
which created overdrafts, (3) the dollar volume of overdrafts and dishonored items, (4)
dates and amounts of deposits, withdrawals, and running balances, (5) a copy of the
customer's signature and addresses used, and (6) opening and closing dates of the
account. This subsection codifies the procedure approved in Johnson and People v.
Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 759, 127 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1976); see notes 137-44 supra
and accompanying text.
173. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5742 (adding section 7480(c) to the Government Code). The tax
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ine records which relate solely to their supervisory functions. 174 Cer-
tain statutorily required tax records may be disclosed to state taxing au-
thorities.175
Finally, the Financial Privacy Act provides criminal and civil penal-
ties and remedies for violation of the statute. Willful violation, or the
inducement of violation by another, is a misdemeanor. 17  A customer
aggrieved by a violation is afforded civil and injunctive relief as well as
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees if the action is successful.1 7   Evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Act is inadmissible, except in a
proceeding to enforce the provisions of the Act.
178
In sum, the new California Right to Financial Privacy Act appears to
be a carefully written law which codifies recent state supreme court and
appellate court decisions in bank privacy cases. Both judicial and statu-
tory law in California now balance the individual's interest in personal
privacy against the government's interest in discovering crime. The
legislature appears to have sought to avoid both the incapacitation of
law enforcement agencies investigating white collar crime, and the
imposition of heavy administrative burdens on banks. At the same
time, the banking customer now has the benefit of definite procedures to
protect his records from uncontrolled disclosure. Proposed federal
legislation appears to be more concerned with countering the intrusive
aspects of the Bank Secrecy Act and California Bankers by giving the
customer an absolute right to prior notice and carefully defined legal
process; in consequence the Congressional bill provides less flexibility
than does the California law for the exigencies of effective law enforce-
ment under judicial supervision.
agencies referred to are the Franchise Tax Board and the State Board of Equalization.
174. Id. (adding section 7480(d) to the Government Code).
175. Id. at 5743 (adding sections 7480(e)-(g) to the Government Code).
176. Id. (adding sections 7485(a), (b) to the Government Code). The crime carries
a maximum fine of $5000, or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. There
is a civil penalty for filing a frivolous motion to quash. Id. (adding section 7485(c) to
the Government Code).
S. 1343 has more explicit civil penalties than the California law. In addition to costs
and attorneys' fees, an aggrieved customer may recover $100 for each violation as well as
actual and punitive damages. S. 1343, § 14(a).
A suit to enforce provisions of S. 1343 may be brought in federal court without regard
to the amount in controversy. Id. § 13.
177. California Right to Financial Privacy Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1320, § 5,
[1976] Cal. Stat. 5743 (adding sections 7486-87 to the Government Code). There is a
three-year statute of limitations. Id. (adding section 7488 to the Government Code).
178. Id. at 5744 (adding section 7489 to the Government Code).
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IV. CONCLUSION
California has quite properly taken the opposite position from that
of the United States regarding the existence of an individual right of
privacy in bank records. Although the United States Supreme Court
purports to "balance" the individual interest in privacy against the social
interest in law enforcement, in Miller, the Court unnecessarily deprives a
bank customer of all privacy in his bank records, apparently to facilitate
government investigation of his financial affairs. In going out of its way
to depreciate yet further the protection which the fourth amendment gives
to an individuars right of privacy, the Court rather speciously ignores
modem economic realities: a person cannot feasibly avoid dealing with
banking institutions in order to retain his right of privacy, nor can he
necessarily rely on his bank to protect his confidentiality at the cost of
displeasing the very government which so heavily regulates banks. It
would be more consistent with the dignity of the Court to say clearly and
directly what it means: that under the present federal constitutional
and statutory scheme, a person who reveals his affairs to a financial
institution in order to avail himself of its services reveals his affairs to
the whole world, and if he wants his private affairs to be protected by
the fourth amendment, he had better keep his money in his mattress.
Congress should recognize what the Court is doing, and if it disap-
proves it should legislate greater protection for the bank customer. The
unsuccessfully proposed Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1973, al-
though a gesture toward individual protection, does not balance interests
any more effectively than the Supreme Court has done; the Act's
provisions are such a strong reaction against the intrusions authorized by
the Bank Secrecy Act that they would make a depositor's records
virtually immune from discovery.
The California judiciary and legislature adopted a more pragmatic ap-
proach to the mutually competing demands of law enforcement, judicial
supervision, civil discovery, banking practice, and individual privacy.
The cases and the new California Right to Financial Privacy Act
accommodate these demands by recognizing explicitly that disclosure to
the government is a search and seizure imposed on the individual.
California law therefore requires procedures to protect the individual's
constitutional right of privacy, and provides civil and criminal penalties
and remedies for the disregard of these procedures. The forthright
California approach should recommend itself to the federal courts,
agencies, and Congress as a model of the true balancing of legitimate
interests.
Carol Stein Boyk
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